the first two hypotheses and supports the third. The current debate over regulatory reform of the banking system has led to a re-examination of the need for government intervention in the monetary sector. One of the central issues in this debate is the role of central banks, and the historical evidence on the circumstances leading to their establishment is crucial. On the one hand there are economists who argue that in every case central banks were imposed by levenue seeking or power hungry governments while, on the other hand, there are those who argue that central banks, specifically in their role as lender of last resort, evolved naturally from a fractional reserve banking system.'
The relatively late appearance of central banking in Canada suggests that her experience may shed some light on the debate. In this paper we examine three competing hypotheses concerning the introduction of central banking in
Canada. The first is that the Bank evolved naturally as a lender of last resort to the fractional reserve banking system. The second is that the bank was introduced to provide an anchor for a largely unregulated monetary system that had just left the certainties of the gold standard, and the final hypothesis is that the Bank's emergence was prompted primarily by political factors independent of the preceding two hypotheses.2 We find most support for the third alternative.
Part II of the paper develops the natural evolution hypothesis and argues that by 1935, the Canadian banking system had developed alternative institutions to perform the functions traditionally associated with a central bank. Part III argues that the Bank of Canada was considered by its framers to be a complement to. not a substitute for, the gold standard, and supports this position with econometric analysis. Part IV discusses the political forces favoring the emergence of the Bank, and Part V briefly discusses the conclusions.
II: The Natural Evolution Hypothesis.
The traditional approach to the origins of central banking views it as part of the natural evolution of a modern banking system. A competitive banking system, with bank money convertible into gold or some other dominant (outside) money, will periodically face the problem of runs on individual banks reflecting the public's fear for the solvency of a particular institution; because of the inability of the non-bank public to distinguish between the liquidity and solvency of related banks a liquidity crisis and a banking panic often will followS Goodhart effectively argues that because of an information asymmetry, a central bank is necessary to act as lender of last resort, and cannot be operated on profit maximizing lines because of potential conflicts of interest between the competitive central -bank and other banks in the system) Goodhart's explanation for the evolution of central banking in England as well as other European countries is that the first central banks evolved from commercial banks which had the special privilege of being the government's bank, Because such banks generally had a sound reputation, because of the economies of pooling reserves through a correspondent banking system, because of their position as holder of the nation's central gold reserve, and because of their ability to provide extra cash by rediscounting, such banks evolved into bankers' banks and lenders of last resort in a liquidity crisis. Once such banks began to perform the role of lender of last resort, 'moral hazard' on the part of member banks (following a more risky strategy) provided a rationale for some form of -supervision or legislation. Further Goodhart argues that the conflict between the public functions of such an institution and satisfying the shareholders made the transition from a competitive bank to a central bank lengthy and painful.
The counter argument has been put most clearly by Vera Smith who rests the case on the fact that central banks did not, in historical fact, evolve naturally but were established as favors to the government of the day. Friedman and Schwartz, while agreeing with Smith, suggest that the case against some form of government role as a lender of last resort is inconclusive,' While private insurance schemes could handle bank insolvency, federal deposit insurance has been, necessary in the U.S. to allay incipient liquidity crises in the unit banking system.
The structure of the Canadian banking system changed considerably between the emergence of the first chartered bank in 1822 and the 1930s, but this process of evolution did not result in the introduction of central banking.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Canadian banking system was comprised of 36 competitive fractional reserve banks, each permitted to operate branches nationwide, The banks required a government charter to commence operations, and some minimum level of paid-up capital. There were no required reserves but banks usually kept quite high levels of reserves since the refusal to convert their notes and demand deposits into specie (or Dominion Notes see below) would result in suspension or forfeit of the charter.
The government's involvement in the monetary sector was through regulation of financial institutions and the issue of convertible, and, in part fiduciary, Dominion Notes. Dominion Notes were legal tender and were generally issued in small denominations for hand-to-hand currency, (the government had a monopoly over the issue of notes of $5 or less) and large denominations (510,000+) used as reserves by the banks. The government held a fractional reserve against its notes, up to a limit above which 100% reserves were required to be held. Because Dominion notes were de facto inconvertible, the Canadian exchange rate was no longer constrained at par. On the other hand, and in contrast to the nineteenth century suspension of convertibility, internal convertibility was maintained i.e. Canadian banks were still required to convert their notes into Dominion notes on demand. The informal suspension continued (more or less)
until October 1931 when, following the British suspension of the gold standard, a formal embargo was placed on gold exports, Consequently, one possible rationale for the establishment of a central bank was to provide an anchor to the money supply, the price level, and hence the exchange rate, in the absence of gold convertiblity, that is, to prevent unregulated private banks acting as profit maximizers from expanding their money issues without limit,'
There is considerable evidence that this hypothesis is at best incomplete.
We have argued elsewhere that the suspension of the gold standard did not create an explosion of the price level as a consequence of profit maximizing banks expanding their money issues, as suggested by traditional models of inflationary finance, because expectations by the banks that the gold standard would be resumed at some traditional par constrained the issue of bank money.' This view is supported by the almost identical deflationary behaviour of the The evidence presented to the Commission shows that it was widely believed that the suspension of the gold standard was temporary. Jackson Dodds, speaking for the CBA, stated: "It is logical to assume that the gold standard (perhaps with modifications) will be resumed in due time by the great trading nations and that the Dominion would naturally desire to follow suit." While Frank Knox, a leading academic economist, stated:
It may be assumed that sooner or later the major trading countries of the world wilt have to come to some agreement as to a common monetary standard and that they will stabilize their several currencys with respect to each other probably by making them convertible once more into gold. Supposing this to have taken place Canada's monetary policy is clearly to join such a group,'°T he debate about the need for a central bank therefore focussed on the need for central banking in a gold standard world, and the argument that the automatic gold standard of the pre-1914 era had been replaced by a managed gold standard. Macmillan's Report stated his position: "The gold standard was restored in a world which called for continuous direction and co-operation on the part of the various national authorities".'1 Indeed the dissenting commissioners felt strongly enough that, while they accepted that at some future date a central bank might be appropriate, they felt that it should wait until the international gold standard was re-established. Macmillan, on the other hand, argued that the present was a particularly advantageous time to establish the bank, as it would not be subject to the day to day discipline of the gold standard until the central We estimate univariate models of the price level and the exchange rateS (data on Canadian interest rates are not available). We also estimate two multivariate models of the price level, in which the independent variables are the U.S. price level, and the money stock -variables which economic theory suggests would affect the price level. In each case, the impact of the formation of the Bank is tested by an analysis of the stability of the regression and by an examination of the regression residuals. An alternative method of determining the stability of the regression is to examine the regression residuals, and to find those residuals that have a disproportionate influence on the estimated model. Figure la Despite the one anomalous significant residual in the Ml model, this battery of tests largely supports the conclusion that the introduction of the Bank of Canada did not alter the money supply process in Canada, and did not affect the evolution of the key nominal variables in the economy.
The annual reports of the Governor of the Bank (1935-39) suggest that this result was not unintentional. In the first annual report the Governor described the functions of the Bank, and how they were being implemented." The five functions listed were: to manage domestic credit; to manage the exchange rate; to advise the government; to. co-operate with other central banks, and to manage the Bank rate. The Bank, however, took a rather agnostic approach to these activities, After admitting that since the Canadian dollar was inconvertible, the Bank could control the level of domestic credit, the Governor argued that the objective of such control was the level of income, which "can grow and does grow without any definite connection between such growth and a growth in bank deposits or notes in circulation" (p. 12).
With respect to the exchange rate, the Governor noted that "the Canadian dollar has exhibited a remarkable tendency, when not at parity with the pound or U.S. dollar to take up an intermediate position" (p. 13). But he took no credit for the level of the exchange rate and rather attributed it to institutional arrangements: "The existence of so many Canadian bonds payable in 2 or 3 currencies .,.. has had a tendency to restrict fluctuations" (p. 13). Finally, with respect to the Bank rate "It is quite out of touch with Treasury Bill rates, but this fact is not at present of any significance" (p. 16).
The governor's report reflects more concern with the housekeeping details of the transfer to the Bank of various activities previously managed by the government (the issue of currency, and the management of the government debt) than with macroeconomic objectives. This is consistent with our econometric analysis which finds that the formation of the Bank had virtually no macroeconomic impact.
IV. The Political Forces, Canada's central bank was not intended to replace the gold standard, and it was not considered a necessary part of a fractional reserve banking system. The emergence of the Bank of Canada, we believe, reflected a conjuncture of political imperatives. Domestically, in an environment where traditional trust in the beneficial nature of the market system was eroding, and a spirit of nationalism was rising, political pressure was mounting to halt the deflation which was frequently blamed on the concentrated banking industry. Internationally, monetary co-operation was said to depend on a system of central banks,
The demand for inflation, while clearly important, is rather ambiguous, The popular demand is succinctly expressed in an article in Maclean's Magazine
The point which our bankers seem to miss is that what the Canadian people want in a central bank is not to supply the other banks with rediscount facilities which they already have or to save us from future panics, [as, it is previously noted, U.S. experience shows they don't] but they do want an institution that will effectually control the whole of the money and credit of the nation, now under the control of the other banks and which will somehow be able to make that money and credit available in sufficient volume wherever legitimately needed, and on terms much more fair and equitable than at present."
The ambiguity arises because there was no stated desire to abandon the gold standard. In addition, the deflation and failure to depreciate the Canadian dollar the-need to anchor a monetary system cast adrift by the suspension of the gold standard, The qualitative evidence suggests that the emergence of the Bank reflected political, rather than economic, imperatives. Domestically, the government needed to be seen to take some active measures to respond to the Depression. and the reduced faith in the omnipotence of the market system, coupled with public hostility towards the banking system, meant that the introduction of a 
